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A COMPUTER INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM AND METHOD BASED ON APPLICATION MONITORING

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This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/161,914, filed

October 28, 1999, which is herein incorporated by reference in its entirety.

5   The U.S. Government has a paid-up license in this invention and the right in limited

circumstances to require the patent owner to license others in reasonable terms as provided for

by the terms of Contract Nos. DAAH01-97-C-R095; DAAHO1-98-C-R145 and F30602-97-C-

0117, each awarded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

BACKGROUND

10   <u>Field of the Invention</u>

The present invention relates to computer intrusion detection systems, and more

particularly to intrusion detection systems based on application monitoring to identify known and

novel attacks on a computer system.

     <u>Background of the Invention</u>

15   Intrusion detection systems ("IDSs") generally take advantage of the extensive auditing

capabilities inherent in many computer operating systems and other auditing facilities which may

be added to a computer system. Such auditing systems can generate logs that capture every

event that occurs during the operation of the computer, or may be configured to capture only a

subset of information concerning specified events. The logs are examined, using manual or

20   automated techniques, to identify possible intrusive activity. Most modern day operating

systems provide the means for capturing a particular user's or process's instructions to the

computer operating system, thereby allowing for full accountability for access to the computer's

resources. Such captured instructions include, for example, all system calls made by an

application, all object requests made by an application, and information related to the individual

processes spawned by the application. Operating systems providing such auditing facilities are well-known in the art, and are commonly referred to as C2 systems. More information on auditing facilities and requirements can be found in *Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria* (also known as the "Orange Book"), published by the National Computer Security

5   Center. For the Linux operating system and other variants of the well-known UNIX operating system, the well-known trace program logs system calls made by processes running on the computer, as well as the results of those system calls. For Sun Microsystem's well-known Solaris operating system, the Basic Security Module ("BSM") produces an "event" record for individual processes, and can log over 200 events, including system instructions issued by each

10   process. For Microsoft's well-known Windows NT operating system, base object auditing provides analogous auditing of a process's access to system resources. That is, whenever an object is requested or accessed by a process, the audit log records the transaction. Other operating systems provide similar audit capabilities. Even when such facilities are not integral to the operating system, a suitable auditing system for gathering data regarding a user's or

15   application's use or interaction with the computer system's resources can be written and implemented according to techniques well-known in the art.

In the computer security arts, two basic strategies have been used in designing and implementing IDSs. In early systems, the basic strategy was to monitor the activities of the computer system's users to identify instances of intrusive user behavior. In such IDSs the goal

20   was to identify user behavior indicating an attack on the system. Activities such as super user login attempts, transfers of sensitive files, or failed file access attempts were flags for potential intrusive activity. One example of such a user-oriented IDS is the Intrusion Detection Expert System ("IDES") developed by Stanford Research International, as described by T.F. Lunt, "A

Survey of Intrusion Detection Techniques," in *Computers and Security,* Volume 12, 1993, pp. 405-418. Other examples are described by T. Lane and C. E. Brodley, "An Application of Machine Learning to Anomaly Detection," in *Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference,* October, 1997, pages 366-377. Lane and Brodley first build user

5 profiles based on sequences of each user's normal command executions, then they attempt to detect an intruder based on deviations from the user's established profile. Similarly, D. Endler, "Intrusion Detection: Applying Machine Learning to Solaris Audit Data," in *Proceedings of the 1998 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference* (ACSAC'98), December, 1998, Scottsdale, AZ, pp. 268-279, describes using neural networks to learn users' behavior based on

10 Sun Solaris BSM events recorded from user actions. A drawback to such user-based IDS is that a user may slowly change his or her behavior to skew the profiling system such that intrusive behavior is deemed normal for that user. Moreover, user-based IDSs raise privacy concerns for users in that such a surveillance system monitors users' every move.

More recently, the focus has changed to monitoring the behavior of applications running

15 on the computer. Such IDSs are based on the concept that every intrusion is, by definition, an unauthorized use or attempt to use the computer's resources using various computer applications. Application-based IDSs are described in more detail below. First, however, a brief discussion of general intrusion detection techniques is presented below.

In addition to being categorized according to the area of focus, i.e., user versus

20 application, IDSs are also categorized according to the way intrusive behavior is identified. In one approach, the IDS analyzes computer audit logs looking for specific patterns corresponding to known attack signatures. This string-matching approach to intrusion detection is known as "misuse detection." Misuse detection systems are described by J. Cannady, "Artificial Neural

Networks for Misuse Detection," in *Proceedings of the 21st National Information Systems Security Conference,* October 5-8, 1998, pp. 443-456. An advantage of misuse detection systems is that such systems have a low false alarm rate. That is, if the system labels a behavior as intrusive, there is a high probability that an attack is present. Moreover, because a misuse IDS

5   looks for known attacks, if an attack is detected, the exact nature of the attack is also identified. While misuse systems provide a fairly reliable way of detecting known attacks against systems, they can have a high false positive rate. That is, when even slight variations of known attacks are encountered, a misuse detection system will likely mislabel the behavior as normal. Unless an identical match to the previously stored signature is made, the attacker is likely to avoid

10   detection. Because known attack signatures can be varied in countless ways, this makes detection of even known attacks a daunting problem. Moreover, a misuse detection approach cannot detect novel attacks against systems, of which there are new ones developed on a continual basis.

A second approach to identifying intrusive behavior is known as "anomaly detection." In

15   this approach, the normal operating characteristics of users or applications are observed to develop profiles reflective of normal behavior. The IDS then compares subsequent computer audit logs of user or application behavior with their associated profiles to determine whether or not the subsequent behavior has deviated from normal behavior. An advantage of an anomaly detection approach is the ability to detect novel attacks against the computer. However, a

20   disadvantage of anomaly detection systems is their inability to identify the exact nature of the attack. An anomaly detection system can only detect that the behavior observed is unusual, such as might constitute an attack, but cannot identify the attack. Moreover, anomaly detection

systems have been prone to excessive false positive identifications because any departure from

normal operations is flagged as a possible attack, as discussed below.

In state-of-the-art anomaly detection systems, an equality matching (also referred to

herein as "string-matching") algorithm is used to identify anomalies. Equality matching

5 algorithms compare, on a string-by-string basis, currently observed application behavior against

a table of previously recorded normal behavior for that application. If a match is made for a

string it is considered normal behavior. Otherwise an anomaly counter is increased. A

drawback, however, to using an equality matching algorithm for intrusion detection is the

inability to generalize from past observed behavior. That is, if the behavior currently observed

10 during monitoring is not an exact match with the previously recorded behavior, then an anomaly

is recorded. Equality matching techniques do not, by themselves, use any notion of similarity to

determine if currently observed behavior is sufficiently close enough to previously recorded

behavior to warrant not recording an anomaly. For this reason, equality matching anomaly

detection systems have traditionally had a high false alarm rate. That is, they tend to send up

15 false warnings of intrusions, therefore providing diminishing utility for the end user.

Two of the more prominent efforts in the prior art to solve these problems are

summarized below. The IDSs described are application monitoring systems directed to anomaly

detection based on known behavior of computer applications.

<u>University of New Mexico</u>

20 A research group at the University of New Mexico ("UNM") implemented string-

matching algorithms in a system capturing short sequences of system calls to build profiles of

behavior for various applications, as described by S. Forrest, S.A. Hofmeyr, and A. Somayaji,

"Computer Immunology," in *Communications of the ACM,* Volume 40, No. 10, October, 1997,

pp. 88-9, and by S. Forrest, S.A. Hofmeyr, A. Somayaji, and T.A. Longstaff, "A Sense of Self

for Unix Processes," in *Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,*

Oakland, CA, May, 1996, pp. 120-128. The UNM group stored the profiles in tables

representing the normal behavior for each application monitored. During online testing or

5   deployment, short sequences of system calls made by each application were captured and

compared with the associated table of normal behavior. If a particular sequence of system calls

captured during the online operation of the application does not match any string in the

application's associated table, an anomaly is recorded.

If the number of anomalies detected is a significant percentage of the overall number of

10   short sequences captured during the online session, then the application's behavior is labeled

intrusive. A problem with this technique is that actual intrusive behavior will tend to be washed

out over time due to the occurrence of "noise." Noise is caused by the normal variability to be

expected in an application's behavior, and yet results in an anomaly being recorded. Noise tends

to occur randomly throughout the application's execution, whereas actual intrusions result in

15   concentrated occurrences of anomalies. Accordingly, a high percentage of noise during an

application's execution can mask the intrusive behavior.

Iowa State University

A group from Iowa State University ("ISU") has implemented an application-based

intrusion detection system that analyzes system calls using state machine models of application

20   behavior, as described in R. Sekar, Y. Cai, and M. Segal, "A Specification-Based Approach for

Building Survivable Systems," in *Proceedings of the 21st National Information Systems Security*

Conference (NISSC'98), October 5-8, 1998, pp. 338-347. However, their approach is not

concerned with detecting anomalies, as much as detecting violations of specified behavior. As a

result, the approach of the ISU group requires the development of specification models for acceptable program behavior. Unfortunately, deriving specification models by hand can be quite a difficult process and is not scalable to the number of programs that need to be specified.

As discussed previously, prior IDSs have employed neural networks to build user profiles based on sequences of commands entered by users. These user-based IDSs were implemented using feed-forward multi-layer perceptron networks, also known as "backpropogation neural networks" or simply "backprops." The backprop is trained to recognize patterns of normal user behavior. After the training, the backprop is used to identify intruders based on deviations from the established user patterns. However, because of the complexities in establishing adequate learning criteria and other problems discussed herein, neural networks have heretofore not been implemented in application-based intrusion detection systems.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention provides a class of intrusion detection systems and methods based on application monitoring using machine learning techniques providing reduced false positive and false negative rates. The present invention comprises two aspects of improved IDSs based on application monitoring. In a first aspect, the present invention provides an improved system and method for anomaly detection using a string-matching algorithm in combination with a temporal locality algorithm. In this aspect of the present invention, the parameters of the string-matching algorithm and the temporal locality algorithm may be advantageously adjusted to accommodate the unique nature of the application being monitored, thereby reducing the IDS's false negative rate without unacceptable increases in the false positive rate.

A second aspect of the present invention provides an improved system and method for both anomaly detection and misuse detection using time series prediction on audit data in

combination with a temporal locality algorithm. The time series prediction may be carried out using any suitable method, such as, for example, artificial neural networks, Bayesian networks, or finite automata.

In one embodiment, a plurality of exemplar strings are used to encode data collected
5   during the execution of an application to be monitored, wherein a distance vector between the exemplar string and the collected data is calculated to determine a corresponding input data for a backprop network. The backprop comprises an input layer, a single hidden layer and an output layer, wherein: the input layer comprises a plurality of input nodes, wherein each input node corresponds to one of the exemplar strings; the hidden layer comprises a plurality of hidden
10   nodes, wherein the number of hidden nodes is determined by a selection process; and wherein the output layer comprises at least one output node. In a preferred embodiment, the temporal locality algorithm counts the number of anomalous or misuse behaviors encountered over time and slowly decrements the counter, whereby clusters, i.e., concentrated incidences, of encountered behavior have a greater weight in the counter process.

15   For anomaly detection purposes, the backprop is trained to learn normal behavior for a particular application to be monitored. The trained network is then used to detect possibly intrusive behavior by identifying significant anomalies, i.e., concentrated differences between the application's normal operating behavior and the behavior observed. Similarly, for misuse detection purposes, the backprop is trained to learn the behavior of the application when various
20   known attacks are implemented. In this aspect, the observed application behavior is input to the trained neural network to identify significant similarities between the observed behavior and the known malicious behavior. The neural networks can generalize from past observed behavior to recognize similar future behavior.

In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, a recurrent neural network is used in combination with a temporal locality algorithm to provide an improved system and method for anomaly detection based on application monitoring. In this embodiment, the neural network comprises an input layer, a single hidden layer, an output layer, and a plurality of context nodes,

5   wherein: the input layer comprises a plurality of input nodes, wherein each input node corresponds to a data mapping for the system instructions; the hidden layer comprises a plurality of hidden nodes, wherein the number of hidden nodes is determined by a selection process; and wherein the output layer comprises a plurality of output nodes corresponding to a segment of system instructions.

10   **BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS**

Figures 1A and 1B are three-dimensional plots of showing the affect the various tunable parameters have on an intrusion detection according to the first aspect of the present invention.

Figure 2 is a schematic diagram showing how application monitors are trained in a preferred embodiment of the present invention.

15   Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a recurrent neural network used in an embodiment of the second aspect of the present invention.

Figure 4 is a schematic diagram showing the program flow in an preferred embodiment of the present invention using a recurrent neural network for the time series prediction algorithm and a tracking queue for the temporal locality identifier.

20   Figure 5 is a schematic diagram showing the program flow in an preferred embodiment of the present invention using a recurrent neural network for the time series prediction algorithm and a "leaky bucket" for the temporal locality identifier.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

As discussed above, the present invention comprises three aspects. In a first aspect, anomaly detection is implemented using a string-matching algorithm which can be tuned to reduce the rate of false-positive identifications. In the second aspect, the present invention uses a neural network to provide both misuse and anomaly detection systems. In a third aspect, a time series prediction system is implemented to detect anomalous behavior in an application.

A. IDS Using String-Matching Algorithm In Combination With Temporal Locality Algorithm

This aspect of the present invention comprises an IDS using a string-matching algorithm in combination with a temporal locality algorithm. In the preferred embodiment, this aspect of the present invention comprises a data collection and pre-processing phase and a monitoring phase, as described below.

Data Collection and Pre-Processing Phase

As discussed above, operating systems typically comprise auditing facilities which generate one or more sets of audit logs. Such auditing facilities are used in this embodiment of the present invention to collect the application data described herein. The exact format of the audit logs, per se, is not important to the present invention. What is important is that the logs comprise a sequential listing of system instructions passed from the application to the operating system during normal operation for each application being monitored. That is, an application profile (also referred to herein as a "model application profile") is developed for each application being monitored. Because applications may spawn more than one process, the sequence of events should identify the individual process identification ("pid") issuing the instructions. The amount of data collected is dependent upon the nature of the application being monitored. In an actual implementation of this embodiment, three weeks of application data was collected.

In most cases, the audit logs will require some pre-processing to parse system calls or object requests made by each application. To reduce disk space requirements, a database or file is constructed by creating N-gram tables, for a given N-gram size. As used herein, an N-gram is a data string comprising a sequential mapping of N instructions passed from an application to the computer operators. That is, an N-gram represents a sequence of N consecutive system instructions issued by any processes invoked by the application. The total number of possible N-grams is dependent upon the total number of possible system instructions available in a particular operating system. For example, in the Solaris operating system, there are over 200 different BSM instructions which an application may generate. Accordingly, a single N-gram can have well over 200^N possible combinations. In practice, however, an application will normally issue only about 10 to 20 different system instructions, reducing the number of N-grams observed to between about 10^N and 20^N.

The database lists every unique N-gram that occurred during the application's execution, as well as the frequency of occurrence. For example, suppose a given application yields the following sequence of events:

[pid 1] A; [pid 2] B; [pid 2] C; [pid 1] D; [pid 1] B; [pid 2] A; [pid 1] D; [pid 1]

B; [pid 2] E; [pid 2] B; [pid 2] D,

where [pid 1] and [pid 2] are the process IDs for two processes spawned during execution of the application, and A, B, C, D, and E represent the various system instructions made by the application. The first step is to separate the data according to individual pids:

[pid 1] A B D B D B; and

[pid 2] C A E B D.

The next step is to build the database table or file. In this case, an N-gram size of two would result in a database table as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, the total number of unique 2-grams is six, and the total number 2-grams is nine.

2-grams Identified	Frequency
AB	1
BD	3
DB	2
CA	1
AE	1
EB	1

5

Table 1

Similarly, for an N-gram size of three, the database table would be as shown in Table 2. In this case, there are six unique 3-grams and only seven total 3-grams.

3-grams Identified	Frequency
ABD	1
BDB	2
DBD	1
CAE	1
AEB	1
EBD	1

Table 2

10 The size of the N-gram, i.e., the number of instructions comprising the data string, may be varied to accommodate a particular application. In the preferred embodiment, the number of instructions is a single data string is six.

Application Monitoring Phase

Once the model application profile for each application is made, the IDS is ready for use 15 to detect intrusions in an operational environment. Audit data is collected during a session to be monitored, and the system instructions issued by any applications run during the session are parsed out as described above. Whatever data string size (i.e., the value of N) was used to create

the original application profiles is used to create application profiles for the session. Each application profile is subdivided into a plurality of segments of data strings. Each segment has a pre-defined length, i.e., a pre-defined number of data strings will be in each segment. Accordingly, for a given session, there are three levels of granularity: a session, which is made up of a plurality of application profiles, which are each made up of a plurality of segments, which in turn are made up of a pre-determined number of data strings. The IDS works as follows:

For each application in the session, the data strings are compared, in the order they were generated, with the associated model application profile. For each segment, a data string counter tracks the number of data strings that are not found in the model profile for the application. If the ratio of such data strings to the total number of data strings in a segment exceeds a pre-determined data string threshold, the segment is labeled anomalous. Similarly, for each anomalous segment in an application profile for a session, a segment counter is incremented. If the ratio of the number of anomalous segments to the total number of segments in the application profile exceeds a segment threshold, the application is labeled anomalous and an application counter is incremented. This process is repeated for each application profile in the session. The session will be labeled intrusive if one of two events occur. First, if the ratio of anomalous applications in the session to the total number of applications in the session exceeds a session threshold, the session is labeled intrusive. Additionally, if any single application is highly anomalous, the entire session is labeled intrusive. Accordingly, for any application, if the ratio of the number of anomalous segments to the total number of segments in the application profile exceeds an application threshold, the session is labeled intrusive.

Each of the thresholds, segment and data string sizes described above may be adjusted to get varying performance results from the IDS. For example to optimize the segment and session thresholds, the performance of the IDS is measured against these two variables while using a fixed data string size and a fixed segment size. An example of such a plot is shown in Figures

5   1A and 1B. For the IDS plotted in Figures 1A and 1B, the optimal values for the segment and application threshold are both about 0.1. The optimal data string and segment sizes can be similarly determined by plotting the performance of the IDS under varying data string and segment sizes, with fixed segment and session thresholds. The results of these analyses will vary for the particular operating systems and operating environments in which the IDS is

10   implemented. For a Solaris operating system, the preferred data string size is six, and the preferred segment size is twenty.

B.   IDS Using Neural Networks In Combination With Temporal Locality Algorithm

This aspect of the present invention also comprises two phases: the training and selection phase; and the application monitoring phase. In the training and selection phase, multiple

15   embodiments a neural network are trained using appropriate audit data, and the best performing network is selected for use in the application monitoring phase. The phases are described in more detail below.

Neural Network Training and Selection Phase

20   The neural network training and selection phase of the present invention involves encoding the data used for input into the network, and training the numerous test networks to identify the best network topology for a given set of training data. As discussed above, the training data used for training and selecting the neural networks may be collected using the auditing facilities inherent in the operating system. Also as noted, other data collecting

applications may be used to identify the operating characteristics of the application. Because the present invention may be used for both anomaly detection and for misuse detection, the data collected should include both normal and malicious operations of the application to be monitored. Moreover, the data should be labeled so that behavior learned by the neural network

5   is correctly identified. The amount of training data collected is dependent upon the nature of the application being monitored. The primary limitation on the amount of training data collected is the system resources consumed in gathering the data. In some instances, the application may experience an extensive variety of system calls during its "normal" operations. In these cases, a longer period of data collection may be necessary, for example, three or four weeks worth of data

10   may be collected before reaching a point of diminishing returns. On the other hand, other applications may have so few combinations of normal operation that a sufficient training data set can be compiled in a few days.

In an actual implementation of the preferred embodiment, the training data comprised a sequential listing of system calls made by the application to be monitored having been collected

15   over a period of four weeks. During this four week period, both normal and malicious operations were recorded and labeled as discussed above. The collected data was divided into two sets: one set was used or training the neural networks and the other set was used for testing the validity of the neural networks and for selecting the best performing network. The testing data should be different than data that was used in the training phase. Accordingly, when collecting data in the

20   initial steps, enough data for training and testing should be collected.

Because most standard auditing facilities can collect data for numerous concurrent sessions, a data preprocessor may be used to prepare the data for training. As shown in Figure 2, data pre-processor 10 receives raw data from audit database 11. Audit database 11 comprises

audit data collected during operation of many different applications, over many different sessions. Data preprocessor 10 separates the data into a different data file for each application to be monitored (e.g., training data files 21 and 31), as shown in Figure 2. Additionally, data preprocessor 10 generates data testing files such as test files 26 and 36. Although the data is

5   consolidated according to the application executed, the data within each file is grouped according to individual sessions. Retaining a session identification allows the IDS of the present invention to classify a session rather than a single invocation of an application, as explained in more detail in the section describing the application monitoring phase, below.

In the preferred embodiment, the neural network comprises a feed-forward

10   backpropogation network and the data is encoded using a distance metric taking into account the events common to two strings, as well as the difference in positions of common events. Accordingly, the distance metric is used to measure the distance from the data string to each of several "exemplar" strings. The distance metrics, such as implemented in the present invention, is commonly referred to in the art as a Levenshtein edit distance, as described, for example, in

15   "An Overview of Sequence Comparison Algorithms in Molecular Biology," Eugene Myers, University of Arizona Technical Report No. TR-91-29, 1991, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

In this embodiment, the backprop neural network topology has an input layer, a hidden layer and an output layer. During the training and selection phase, several parameters should be

20   tested to determine the best performing neural network. For example, the number of input and output nodes and the number of nodes in the hidden layer should be determined. The number of input nodes used in the neural network depends on the number of exemplar strings, since each exemplar string yields a different distance for input into the network. A single output node is

used in a preferred embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, the more anomalous the input is, the closer to 1.0 the network computes its output. Conversely, the closer to normal the input is, the closer to 0.0, the output node computes.

The number of hidden nodes for the neural networks is determined as part of the selection process. That is, several different networks with several different hidden nodes are trained using the training data sets described above. In an actual implementation of this embodiment, networks having 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 50, and 60 hidden nodes were trained for each application to be monitored. Moreover, in this implementation ten different sets of initial weights were used for each network topology tested. Accordingly, for each application to be monitored, 90 different neural networks (nine topologies, with ten different initialization settings) were initialized.

The neural networks were trained in an iterative process of exposing training data to the network; performing the well-known backprop algorithm to adjust the weights, checking the total number of errors made, and repeating the process. The backprop algorithm is described in more detail in "Neural Networks for Pattern Recognition," Christopher Bishop, Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995 pp140-148, which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety. For each network trained, the process was continually repeated until the total error made from one iteration to the next stopped decreasing (i.e., the network stopped learning), or until 1,000 iterations had been run.

As shown in Figure 2, the training data associated with each application is fed into the plurality of initialized networks created for each application. For example, training data 21 is fed into plurality of untrained networks 22 and training data 31 is fed into plurality of untrained networks 32, to train a plurality of neural networks for applications 1 and 2, respectively. In

training steps 23 and 24, the weights are adjusted after each iteration to better teach the network.

As discussed above, in each case, if a neural network has not improved its learning, or if 1,000

iterations have been performed, the training phase ends. As shown in Figure 2, the training

phase results in a plurality of trained networks (e.g., plurality of trained networks 24 and 34)

5   associated with each application to be monitored. In a preferred embodiment, the number of

trained networks in each plurality is the same as the number of initialized networks in each

plurality. That is, no selection of best networks is made until the selection process described

below.

As previously described, some of the data collected during both normal and malicious

10   operation of each application is held back for use as testing data. As shown in Figure 2, testing

data 25 is applied to plurality of trained networks 24 and testing data 35 is applied to plurality of

trained networks 34, for applications 1 and 2, respectively. In selection steps 26 and 36, the

trained network producing the best results is selected from each plurality of trained networks.

For example in Figure 2, trained network 27 is selected from plurality of trained networks 24

15   because it had the highest accuracy rate in classifying the test data as normal or anomalous.

Similarly, trained network 37 is selected from plurality of trained networks 34. For the anomaly

detection system, the most accurate neural network would yield the lowest overall (i.e., lowest

average) output when normal data is supplied and would yield the highest overall output when

malicious testing data is supplied. Conversely, for the misuse detection system, the highest

20   output value corresponds to a match or near match of malicious behavior, whereas normal

behavior should result in lower output values in the neural network.

Application Monitoring Phase

After the neural networks have been trained and selected for each application to be monitored the IDS is ready for use in the application monitoring phase. In this phase, application audit data is captured and analyzed in real-time, i.e., it is processed as it is produced, or as soon thereafter as possible. As described in the previous section, the audit data may be fed into a data preprocessor for separating the data according to the applications being monitored. The data pre-processor collects this data, separates each monitored application's data into distinct application data streams and converts each data stream into the representation for that particular application's monitor. These data streams represent an execution trace for each monitored application, and are also referred to herein as "application data profiles." The application data profile is fed into the appropriate trained application monitor (i.e., trained neural network). Note that the same encoding for exemplar strings used to train the networks should be used for the application monitoring phase. The application monitor then processes the data and outputs an anomaly value. The anomaly value is tracked via a temporal locality identifier system described more fully in the next section. If the temporal locality identifier indicates numerous anomalies accumulated over a short period of time, then the session is labeled intrusive. If not, the operation continues without notice.

For anomaly detection purposes, the neural network may be trained to learn normal behavior for a particular application to be monitored. The trained network is then used to detect possibly intrusive behavior by identifying significant anomalies, i.e., concentrated differences between the application's normal operating behavior and the behavior observed. Similarly, for misuse detection purposes, the neural network may be trained to learn the behavior of applications under attack. In this aspect, the monitored application behavior is applied to the

trained neural network to identify significant similarities between the observed behavior and the known malicious behavior. The neural networks can generalize from past observed behavior to recognize similar future behavior. Accordingly, the IDS of the present invention can recognize both novel and known attacks.

5   C.   **IDS Using Time Series Prediction In Combination With Temporal Locality Algorithm**

The preferred embodiment of the present invention may be implemented using any suitable system for predicting events in a time series. In an actual implementation of the preferred embodiment, a recurrent neural network was used as described below. One of ordinary skill in the art could implement the present invention using any one of a number of time series prediction system, including, e.g., Bayesian networks, other artificial neural networks, finite automata, and the like. This aspect of the present invention also comprises two phases: the training and selection phase; and the application monitoring phase. In the training and selection phase, multiple embodiments of the time series prediction system are trained using appropriate audit data, and the best performing system is selected for use in the application monitoring phase. The phases are described in more detail below.

Time Series Prediction Training and Selection Phase

In the actual implementation of the preferred embodiment, a recurrent neural network was used in combination with a temporal locality identifier to provide an improved system and method for anomaly detection based on application monitoring. In this implementation, the neural network comprised an input layer, a single hidden layer, an output layer, and a plurality of context nodes, as shown in Figure 3. The number of input nodes (e.g., input nodes 303 and 304) depends on the data encoding scheme used to encode the audit data collected for each session. In this implementation, each system instruction that the particular operating system allowed was

assigned an integer value. Then, each integer value was further mapped to a randomly selected number comprising n bits. The audit collected was parsed using a preprocessor as described above. The data is then fed into the neural network, N events at a time. Accordingly, the number of input nodes, was Nxn, wherein each node represents a single bit (0 or 1), and the first

5   n nodes comprise a single captured event, the next n bits comprise the next captured event, and so on. In the actual implementation described herein, it was found that the best results were achieved for n=20 and N=6, however, as would be apparent to one skilled in the art, the nature of the program and the operating system may yield different results.

The hidden layer comprises a plurality of hidden nodes (e.g., hidden node 310) and a

10   plurality of context nodes (e.g., context node 311). As shown in Figure 3, each hidden node receives input from each input node and from one of the context nodes. Each hidden node provides input to the output nodes (e.g., output nodes 320 and 321) in the output layer, as shown in Figure 3. A fixed weight is assigned to each of the links feeding from a context node to its associated hidden node. For example, link 312 links context node 311 to hidden node 310 and

15   has a fixed weight. In contrast, all of the other links, such as links from the input nodes to the hidden nodes, links from the hidden nodes into the context nodes (e.g., link 313) and links from the hidden nodes into the output nodes have weights adjusted during the network training phase.

As shown in Figure 3, the number of output nodes is equal to the number of bits used to encode the data events, i.e., n bits are used. The output of the recurrent network shown in Figure

20   3 comprises n bits representing the predicted next event in the time series of data. That is, given the input of N events, the output is the next event. A "sliding window" is used to input the data events. That is, after the first N events are fed into the network, the first event fed in is dropped

and the next event is fed in together with the remaining data previously fed in. Accordingly,

each piece of data is used N times as input to the neural network.

The training phase encompasses feeding the audit data into the neural network and

comparing the output at each step with the actual next event in the times series. The adjustable

5   weights for each link are adjusted according to well-known recurrent neural network training

techniques. As with the backprop network, several recurrent neural networks are trained, and the

best performing network for each application is selected.

Application Monitoring Phase

In this embodiment, the application monitoring phase is similar to that described above

10   for the neural networks. That is, data is collected during a session on the host computer. The

data may be collected using an audit program or other suitable means, and may be collected in

real-time, or on a time-delayed basis. The data is parsed using a data preprocessor to separate

the data events (i.e., system calls, object requests, etc.) according to application and pid. Figure

4 shows the application monitoring phase for a single application. As shown in Figure 4,

15   application audit data 301 is provided to data preprocessor 302 for parsing the data stream into a

sequential listing of events for each pid. Data preprocessor 302 further maps the events

according to the same bit mapping used to encode the input data for training the network. That

is, each event is mapped into n bits. Then, N events, so mapped, are fed into the recurrent neural

network, via input nodes (e.g., input nodes 303 and 304). The output nodes represent the next

20   event predicted by the recurrent neural network. As shown in Figure 4, the output bits are

provided to error check routine 330 which compares the predicted event with the actual next

event in the series. error check routine 330 determines how different the predicted value is from

the actual value. If the values are too different, an anomaly is detected.

In one implementation, the difference between the predicted event and the actual event is calculated as follows:

sum = 0;

for each of the n output nodes (i being the current output node):

5   d_i = the difference between the activation of the ith output node and the value of the ith bit in the audit event,

v_i = d_i squared,

sum = sum + v_i,

end of loop;

10   calculate the square-root of sum.

That is, the square-root of sum is the error the neural-network made in predicting the next audit event. This error then has the expected error subtracted from it. The expected error is the average error obtained for audit data coming from a given program when the original training data is applied to the neural network again. in this implementation, there was no absolute value or squaring, so the result could be negative. The resulting error value is placed at the end of queue 350, which is a queue having size y. In an actual embodiment of the present invention, the queue size, y was 10. The first score in the queue is discarded. All of the scores in the queue are averaged to calculate an anomaly score for the particular audit event predicted by the neural network. The score for an application is the maximum of all the scores obtained for the audit

20   events produced by that application, and the score for a session is the maximum score over all programs.

In another embodiment, shown in Figure 5, the temporal locality algorithm counts the number of anomalous or misuse behaviors encountered over time and slowly decrements the

counter, thereby numerous encountered behaviors have a greater weight in the counter process. As shown in Figure 5, event counter 360 is used to track the number of events fed into the neural network. After each prediction is made, error check 330 tests the prediction against the actual next event in the data and determines whether or not the event represents an anomaly. In step 340, the event counter is checked to see if a full segment of data has been processed. A segment is a pre-determined number of events. If the pre-determined number of events have been processed, the event counter is reset to zero in step 341, and the anomaly counter C is decremented by a pre-determined amount in step 342. If a full segment has not yet been processed, step 343 determines if the predicted value was correct. If the predicted value was correct, in step 344 the next event is retrieved from application audit data 301. If the predicted value was not correct, an anomaly is recorded by incrementing the anomaly counter in step 345, and the process moves on to step 344 where the next event is processed.

The foregoing disclosure of embodiments of the present invention has been presented for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise forms disclosed. Many variations and modifications of the embodiments described herein will be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the above disclosure. The scope of the invention is to be defined only by the claims appended hereto, and by their equivalents.